General remarks on some ontological premises of Aquinas' Epistemology.

An analysis of personal self-determination with a special reference to Aquinas.

Philosophical reflections about the complex relationship between Jacobi and Fichte on realism and idealism.

An interpretation of Jacobi's philosophical realism.

La cultura contemporanea è di solito denominata post-moderna. Essa si colloca nei confronti della modernità in un modo dialettico, assumendo l'ispirazione moderna ma criticandone alcune delle sue pretese. Il risultato è un contesto con luci e ombre in cui emergono importanti sfide, tra cui: il ricupero di una ragione non unilaterale e il superamento dei riduzionismi sociali e antropologici provocati dalla secolarizzazione. Se l'emarginazione della religione e l'indifferentismo religioso – fenomeni propri del processo di secolarizzazione – provocano un vuoto nell'uomo, (...) una sensibilità religiosa di carattere funzionale e individualista si rivela insufficiente in termini antropologici e religiosi. Di fronte a queste sfide, la fede cristiana si pone come istanza che permette l'apertura alla verità ( credo ut intelligam ) e offre la salvezza all'uomo nel ricondurlo all'amore di Dio. (shrink)

Summary and reflections about a recent philosophical congress on Consciousness.

Ao evidenciar que as relações estabelecidas por homens e mulheres com o meio concreto engendram o real, a dialética torna exequível a revolução do status quo por possibilitar a compreensão de que o mundo é sempre resultado da práxis humana, seja ela marcada por relações de dominação que reificam e fetichizam a prática social, seja marcada por relações que operam a humanização dos homens e mulheres. Ao romper com os fetiches, ou seja, ao perceber que os objetos não devem sujeitá-los, (...) homens e mulheres avançam de encontro à reificação, alçando-se a possibilidade de revolucionar suas condições de existência. Assim, o rompimento da pseudoconcreticidade ocorre no momento em que se evidencia que a realidade social se concretiza por meio das condições de produção e reprodução da existência social das pessoas, que é em nossa sociedade marcada pela luta de classes. Este processo de rompimento exige um esforço construtor de uma interpretação do real que vá para além de uma representação caótica do todo, típico das vivências cotidianas. Este artigo postula que o método materialista histórico dialético pode auxiliar neste processo. Partindo desta constatação, elabora-se reflexão sobre este método de análise do real. By showing that the relationships established by men and women with the practical means to engender real, dialectic makes possible the revolution of the status quo by allowing the understanding that the world is always the result of human practice, it is marked by relations of domination that fetishize and reify the social practice or marked by relationships that operate at the humanization of men and women. By breaking with the fetishes, or to realize that objects should not expose them, men and women advance against reification, raising the possibility of revolutionizing his conditions of existence. Thus, disruption of pseudoconcreticity occurs at the moment is evident that social reality is concretized through the conditions of production and reproduction of social existence, which is in our society marked by class struggle. This process requires a breakout effort to construct an interpretation of reality that go beyond a representation of the whole chaotic, typical of everyday experiences. This article posits that the historical materialist dialectical method con help this process. Based on this observation, we undertake reflection on this method of analysis of the real. (shrink)

For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science of knowledge (SoK) and additionally distinguishes (...) knowledge from both data and information. In this paper, I attempt to sketch this generality via the establishing of both knowledge structures and knowledge systems that can then be adopted/adapted by the diverse communities for the respective knowledge technologies and practices. This is achieved by means of a formal–indeed, mathematical–approach to epistemological matters a.k.a. formal epistemology. The corresponding application focus is on knowledge systems implementable as computer programs. (shrink)

Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today's large plethora of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies; theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-in-hand, (...) and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontology of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of today's upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a translation into English of the first part of Dietrich's De origine (abbreviated title) that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin philosophical texts and contemporary ontology. (shrink)

The representational nature of human cognition and thought in general has been a source of controversies. This is particularly so in the context of studies of unconscious cognition, in which representations tend to be ontologically and structurally segregated with regard to their conscious status. However, it appears evolutionarily and developmentally unwarranted to posit such segregations, as,otherwise, artifact structures and ontologies must be concocted to explain them from the viewpoint of the human cognitive architecture. Here, from a by-and-large Classical cognitivist viewpoint, (...) I show why this segregation is wrong, and elaborate on the need to postulate an ontological and structural continuity between unconscious and conscious representations. Specifically, I hypothesize that this continuity is to be found in the symbolic-based interplay between the syntax and the semantics of thought, and I propose a model of human information processing characterized by the integration of syntactic and semantic representations. (shrink)

Genera, typically hand-in-hand with their branching species, are essential elements of vocabulary-based information constructs, in particular scientific taxonomies. Should they also feature in formal ontologies, the highest of such constructs? I argue in this article that the answer is “Yes” and that the question posed in its title also has a Yes-answer: The way medieval ontologists sliced up the world into genera does matter to formal ontology. More specifically, the way Dietrich of Freiberg, a Latin scholastic, conceived and applied strictly (...) generic criteria to slice up the world into its entities can provide some guidelines to the field of formal ontology with respect to not only its contents, but also its scope. In particular, Dietrich's information criterion plays here a central role. (shrink)

The traditional model of human cognition (TMHC) postulates an ontological and/or structural gap between conscious and unconscious mental representations. By and large, it sees higher-level mental processes as commonly conceptual or symbolic in nature and therefore conscious, whereas unconscious, lower-level representations are conceived as non-conceptual or sub-symbolic. However, experimental evidence belies this model, suggesting that higher-level mental processes can be, and often are, carried out in a wholly unconscious way and/or without conceptual representations, and that these can be processed unconsciously. (...) This entails that the TMHC, as well as the theories on mental representation it motivates and that in turn support it, is wrong. (shrink)

An analysis of--yet another--case of academic failure in multi- and interdisciplinarity. An editorial of the Journal of Knowledge Structures & Systems.

This book concerns the nature and the norms of inquiry. It tackles not only philosophical issues regarding what inquiry is, but also issues regarding how it should and should not be executed. Roughly put, inquiry is the activity of searching for the true answers to questions of our interest. But what is the difference between empirical and armchair inquiry? And what are the right and the wrong ways to inquire? Under what conditions should one start inquiring? Which questions are such (...) that one should not inquire into them? The book offers answers to these questions. It argues that competent armchair inquiry only makes explicit what was already implicit--the inquirer already had the answer to her question before inquiring into it, though this was not explicit to her. It also argues that we should avoid inquiring into questions whose answers are unknowable to us, in the instrumental sense of 'should', and that different modes of inquiry are called for, depending on which type of information is available to the subject. These answers are rigorously argued for, and they stem from a unified framework for modeling the activity of inquiry. (shrink)

During the Mexico-Canda Conference in October 2020 at Western University (Canada) I submitted a draft of a future paper.

Just started a new book. The aim is to establish a science of knowledge in the same way that we have a science of physics or a science of materials. This might appear as an overly ambitious, possibly arrogant, objective, but bear with me. On the day I am beginning to write it–June 7th, 2020–, I think I am in possession of a few things that will help me to achieve this objective. Again, bear with me. My aim is well (...) reflected in the title I chose (just now) for this book: Knowledge & Logic: Towards a science of knowledge. Its most important feature is that I shall take logic to be to knowledge science as calculus is to physics or to materials science. I do not intend to reclaim knowledge from the bosom of philosophy, in which, known as epistemology its erudite discussion has hardly progressed since Plato first defined it as true belief with logos. With only a few adjustments, it will actually provide me with the right, science-bound start. More recently, knowledge has been reclaimed by the field of BA, a reclaim that has opened the box of Pandora: Among the evils, and perhaps at the head of the list, is an overly lay, essentially naive, notion of knowledge. But the very idea that one can have something like “knowledge (management) software” puts us on the right track. (shrink)

O conceito de tempo é uma das formas primordiais para entender como a atividade filosófica acontece em diferentes culturas. Assim, este artigo analisa como a temporalidade é interpretada pela Fenomenologia e pela Filosofia Nagô por meio de uma dialogia através dos esquemas intencionais da consciência fenomenológica e do jogo de posições circuladas por Èṣú. A partir dessa circulação em Èṣù serão apresentadas as implicações filosóficas sobre a temporalidade que caracterizam a Filosofia Nagô. Palavras-chave: Èṣú; Filosofia Nagô; Fenomenologia; Temporalidade.